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Economic and political background in Cyprus 
Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and immediately wanted to get into the euro area for the 
express purpose of completing as quickly as possible the union with the core of Europe. It 
was done because the public thought that would be beneficial for political reasons, not 
economic reasons. The strategic location of the island has made it a target over the millennia 
of various powers, and the country is just too small and weak. 
There are several reasons why Cyprus could develop a large financial sector over three 
decades ago. It had double taxation treaties with a number of countries, the Soviet Union for 
example. That means, if profits are booked and earned and taxed in Cyprus, they are not 
taxed again in the other country. Russian deposits are in Cyprus because it has a low 
corporate tax rate, much like Malta and Luxembourg, which annoys some people in Europe. 
In addition, Cyprus has a legal system based on English law and follows English accounting 
rules. It has a well-educated work force that can provide financial services, and a high 
concentration of lawyers and accountants. As a result of that, a lot of foreign interests, 
including from Russia, have a number of corporations based in Cyprus and organize their 
international business globally from Cyprus. This model is similar to what we see in other 
countries: for example, there are even more Russian interests in the Netherlands and in 
Luxembourg. 
 
The financial crisis in Cyprus 
A number of factors played a role in producing the crisis in Cyprus. The global financial crisis 
and exposure to Greece made Cyprus vulnerable. But the outcome was determined by 
decisions taken by the previous government in Cyprus as well as the broader malfunction of 
the euro area over the past three years. 
Two months after Cyprus joined the euro area [in January, 2008], there were presidential 
elections and the Cypriot public elected as president a communist, Demetris Christofias. The 
public was convinced he could solve the political problem Cyprus had with Turkey and 
reunify the island. The issue was not economic. 
If one thing has become clear over the last five years in Cyprus, it is that the euro area, which 
is not just a market economy but a currency union with strict rules, is not compatible with a 
communist government. Why is this important? This government took a country with 
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excellent fiscal finances, a surplus in fiscal accounts, and a banking system that was in 
excellent health. They started overspending, not only for unproductive government 
expenditures but also they raised implicit liabilities by raising pension promises, and so forth. 
Because of the fiscal policies that the government pursued, it damaged the confidence of 
international investors and lost access to international capital markets in May of 2011. If the 
government had behaved as other governments did, they would have asked for assistance 
from the EU at that time, in May of 2011. The size of the banking sector and exposure to 
Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus and the 
structural adjustments necessary to restore fiscal stability in the country were rather minor. 
 As with any country with a large financial sector, a solid fiscal position was crucial to avoid 
creating doubts about the ability of the sovereign to serve as a temporary backstop, in case 
that became necessary. I was there at the time and as the central bank governor I was 
warning the government that not dealing with this issue in the context of the euro area crisis 
was extremely dangerous. Others had also warned the government, including ECB President 
Trichet. They were not willing to do anything because as a communist party they did not 
want to incur the political cost of adopting consolidation measures. 
 
Munitions explosion destroying main power station 
Then on July 11, 2011 there was an explosion that destroyed the power station producing 
more than half the power supply of the island. It was triggered by 100 or so containers of 
ammunition stored in the sun for two years next to the power station. The containers were 
part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip 
from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition.
3
The same month the European Banking Authority put the two largest Cypriot banks, which 
are being targeted now, through a stress test along with other banks in the EU. The results 
were published on July 15, 2011. Both banks passed the stress tests. If the government had 
applied at that time for a reasonably small package from the troika, they could have fixed 
the fiscal problem fairly easily. Again, they didn't, because they didn't want to do structural 
adjustments. Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that 
would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, 
unfortunately, in retrospect, with 2.5 billion euro which is a big chunk of money for a 
country with a 17 billion euro GDP. I say unfortunately because as a result the government 
could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action. 
 Cyprus did not have 
a severe recession in 2009 from the global crisis. The slowdown was fairly mild. But after the 
explosion, the economy was thrown into a recession. I recall that on July 18 I sent a 
confidential letter to the president and leaders of all parties, calling for urgent measures to 
avert a crisis. Instead of heeding the warning, my letter was leaked to the press and my calls 
for action severely criticized by the government. 
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The haircut on Greek debt in October 2011 
The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels 
where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of 
Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where 
it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt. There were subsidiaries of French banks 
operating in Greece and  a Portuguese bank, that were wiped out. Our two largest banks had 
major operations in Greece and significant exposure, so the Greek part of the operation and 
the bond holdings suffered a lot of damage. For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was 
between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital. 
The second element of the decision taken by heads of states was to instruct the EBA to do a 
so- called capital exercise that marked to market sovereign debt and effectively abruptly 
raised capital requirements. The exercise required banks to have a core tier-1 ratio of 9%, 
and on top of that a buffer to make up for differences in market and book value of 
government debt. That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area 
which is the cause of the recession we've had in the euro area for the last 2 years. 
For Cyprus, the combination of haircut and stress test meant that after taking measures, the 
two largest banks needed about 2 billion euro of additional capital to be recapitalized 
according to the guidelines of the EBA. That was the first time someone could say: 'Your 
banks require assistance.' After losing more than 4.5 billion on the haircut on the Greek 
debt, this suggests how much capital they held before. 
The heads of states decision also said that if banks were not able to raise capital on their 
own, then the country is responsible for finding the capital and injecting it. The president of 
Cyprus agreed and did not ask for any provision to protect the country. Since all the holdings 
of Greek debt were public information (they had been published with the July EBA stress 
test), everyone could calculate what the haircut meant for the banks and since the Cypriot 
government was out of the markets the implications could be foreseen. You could say, well if 
they hadn't entered a program before, they should have considered it now. But again they 
did not want to ask for assistance, because the troika would have forced them to make 
structural adjustments which the government did not want to do. 
 
The impact of banking supervision 
Because the government did not take the necessary steps, the banking supervision had to 
take action. The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the 
EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of 
government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset  –   that is these assets 
are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements. This is the reason why ECB 
President Jean-Claude Trichet and most central bankers and supervisors were so alarmed at 
the prospect of the governments introducing credit risk (as was done in Deauville in October 
2010) and at the prospect of considering defaults (as was done starting in late July 2011) in 
euro area sovereigns. It turned the supervisory framework in place upside down. 4 
 
To mitigate risks, the supervisor can ask a bank to raise additional capital. In Cyprus this was 
done and the two large banks raised significant amounts in 2009, 2010 and even as late as 
early 2011. After the government lost access to markets in May 2011 this became much 
harder, virtually impossible. 
Still, by spring 2012, with an additional 2 billion Euro the banks could have met the EBA 9% 
plus capital buffer core-tier 1 set for the capital exercise. That was roughly 11% of GDP and 
would not have been an issue if the government had not lost market access, as in that case 
the government could have injected this amount in any bank that needed it by issuing public 
debt. 
The ECB and the governors in general had been arguing before that capital exercise was 
done that the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct 
recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the 
capitalization. That element created the adverse feedback loop between banks and 
sovereigns. They forced the stress test and recapitalization before they could reach an 
agreement on how to find resources for the recapitalization. Mario Draghi characterized the 
private sector involvement on Greek debt, in association with these elements, as similar to a 
European Lehman in an FT interview. 
 
Intensification of the crisis 
When my term ended on May 2, 2012, the recapitalization had not been completed. Instead 
of focusing on a solution, however, the government engaged on an assault on the banking 
system and started rallying on the slogan that the banks were responsible for all ills in the 
economy in preparation for the February 2013 election. 
Starting in July 2012, the press was reporting that the banking system needed 10 billion euro 
of capital, citing sources at the central bank. Some reports suggested the numbers were 
deliberately exaggerated as the issue had become part of the February 2013 presidential 
election campaign. When the press started reporting such unrealistically high numbers I 
became extremely concerned and warned in an interview that if the central bank was 
generating such high numbers it risked putting into question the sustainability of the 
country's debt. Under standard IMF sustainability analysis, the country's debt could be 
deemed unsustainable and the troika might ask for some form of a haircut. Indeed, the debt 
sustainability analysis created the debate over whether there should be some form of bail-in 
associated with the program in Cyprus. 
Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the 
sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the 
government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the 
ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the 
case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule. This was important 
because if Cyprus debt had remained eligible as collateral, Cyprus banks could continue to 
buy treasury bills and continue financing the needs of the country for some time. The ECB 5 
 
was trying to convince the Cyprus government that it had to make structural adjustments 
and fiscal adjustments and by that point in June, get into a program. 
By triggering the loss of eligibility of the government debt as collateral, the ECB telegraphed 
to the government it had to go to the troika. The Cyprus government did formally ask for 
troika assistance in June of 2012, on the same day the Spanish government asked for 
assistance for its banking system. Even then, had the government accepted that they needed 
to make structural adjustments and negotiated a program, which could have been done over 
two weeks, the government would have obtained financial assistance. If capital needs of 
banks had not been exaggerated, there would be no sustainability issue. 
Again, the government did not do that. They did not want to negotiate. According to press 
reports, the ECB communicated to the Cyprus government around November that if it did 
not engage in serious negotiations, it would consider cutting off liquidity. When that 
occurred, the government agreed to bring the troika back and negotiate a program. That 
program and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) were completed in December. Its 
elements included major reductions in pension benefits, major reductions in wages and 
salaries for the broader public sector and privatizations of government owned or semi-
government owned corporations. It also included the suspension of cost of living 
adjustments, which were incompatible with being in the euro area. 
All these were agreed to in principle by an MOU. The government took them to parliament 
and the parliament immediately adopted them. What was not clear was what was 
negotiated about the banking system. 
 
Recent events 
In the February election the communist candidate was defeated and a conservative 
president, Nicos Anastasiades, took over on March 1. He wanted to complete the 
adjustment program that had been delayed so long as soon as possible, in an honest 
manner. Cyprus expected a program with similar terms to those faced by the other 
countries. Instead, he was effectively ambushed by the other governments at the very first 
meeting of the European council that he attended and the associated eurogroup meeting. 
On March 15-16, the other governments confronted the new president and new finance 
minister with blackmail: either you haircut deposits or we shut down the economy; the ECB 
would cut off liquidity to the banks. 
The Cyprus parliament had already passed a number of laws that influenced the current and 
future spending and pensions. And they were also in the process of finalizing how they 
would do privatizations of the semi public companies. So all the standard elements you'd 
expect in other programs had been done or were being done. 
The question is: Why did they attack retail deposits in this manner? This had never before 
been a requirement of any other program. And why did the German government insist in the 
last three days that there should be a bail-in? The only logical explanation I could see is that 
Angela Merkel's government faces re-election in September of 2013 and the SPD [the Social 6 
 
Democratic party, the principal opposition to Ms Merkel's Christian Democratic Union] has 
made it an issue: it does not want to support a loan by the German government to Cyprus 
because, they claim, that would be like bailing out the Russian oligarchs. This is how Cyprus 
got caught up in the German election. 
In the previous three programs [Greece, Ireland and Portugal] the SPD supported Merkel's 
government on making the loans, but they were not as close to the election as this one. The 
SPD, I believe, was trying to differentiate its position. This presented a dilemma for Merkel's 
government. If she suggested that a loan be given to Cyprus to bail out money from Russia, 
this would not go well with the debate in Germany. So it was incredibly convenient to say 
that all the depositors, including Russian depositors, be asked to be bailed in. To support this 
reasoning, unsubstantiated statements were being made in the German press that deposits 
in Cypriot banks reflect money laundering and that the banking model of Cyprus could not 
be allowed to continue. The objective of the March 16 plan to confiscate part of deposits 
was none other than to damage irreparably the Cypriot banking system. 
 
Conclusion 
The politics, in my mind, is what makes this episode so ugly. Some governments, to serve 
their own national or narrow political interests, arrived at a decision that inflicts irreparable 
damage to Cyprus. This is similar to the blunder in Deauville with PSI that injected credit risk 
into sovereign government debt. The governments have created risk in what before last 
week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on 
deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding 
will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses 
and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the 
recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for 
European economic management as a whole. 
 